

The Utility of Fiction in Politics: ‘Deception’ and Public Communication.

In *Each Other’s Yarns*, edited Goring, Mitchell and Lothe (Novus Press, Oslo 2012).

Essay for Jeremy Hawthorn. 155-168.

John Corner

It is impossible to study communication of any kind without regularly encountering issues around modes of deception, raising questions about their motivation, their discursive form (including their aesthetics) and their consequences. Literature provides us with a wide range of portrayals of deceptive behaviour, sometime behaviour around which the entire plot of a novel or play turns, taking us deep into character as well generating a variety of sometimes violent incidents. In the introduction to his original and broadly conceived 1986 collection on ‘Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic’, Jeremy Hawthorn illustrated this well by giving sustained attention to the performance of Anthony in *Julius Caesar*, Act 3 Scene 2.¹ Any sociology of the contemporary everyday would have to point to the pervasiveness of deceptive behaviour in a wide range of contexts embracing the many dimensions of interpersonal, private life through to different social, institutional and commercial settings. Quite apart from experiences with family and with friends, as an academic, I have routinely been the subject of deceptive work by colleagues, heads of departments, Deans, conference organisers, editors and publishers. It is important to

note that some of these incidents were not really effective as deceptions at all because I quickly recognised them as strategic untruths (a recognition which might have been intended), while other communications actually did work, annoyingly, to give me, a false view of the situation in order to protect, for the time being, the position of the sender (e.g. ‘there are no plans that I am aware of to reduce postgraduate numbers’ for which it would have been best to read *‘from what I’ve seen, it is likely your numbers will be cut next academic year’*; ‘we hope to have a final decision on your article within in a day or so’ for which it would have been best to read *‘we have temporarily lost contact with the referee, who we believe is somewhere in Australia’*). I should add that in many of the roles in which deception has been practised on me, I have been pretty adept at it myself on occasion. In these kinds of case, there is usually a sense of the ethical limits beyond which not telling the truth becomes ‘bad behaviour’ but there is also recognition of the inadvisability of total transparency. If, however, we try to project these moments outwards on to the broader interactions of the social and political system, some serious problems arise. There may be a degree of match between interpersonal, even professional settings and broader civic settings but matters of deception and of truth clearly need to be given their own specific attention as aspects of public communication. For a start, the connection with questions of power is likely to be very different, involving distinctive relations of trust and of duty, and any subsequent argument that any deceit practised was ‘for the best’ is likely to meet with a high degree of scepticism.

I take my title from the writings of another Jeremy, Jeremy Bentham, a stern critic of many forms of deceptive behaviour but, like many commentators before him and since, not unaware of the usefulness which ‘fictions’ can have on certain occasions, by no means all of them literary in character. The scale and intensity of

public communication has grown enormously since Bentham was writing, and so has the proliferation of deceptive possibilities and techniques. Indeed it might be claimed that one of the dominant modes of speech and writing in international public life today – varieties of the ‘promotional’ as the major form of ‘publicity’ – is grounded in diverse strategies of deception, however much legal controls, such as those imposed in many countries on advertising, work to reduce the scale and frequency of the more serious breaches of trust.

I have been interested in questions of deception for some time and it was an interest that developed strongly during the period between 1975 and 1979 when I worked alongside Jeremy Hawthorn in the development, and then the teaching, of the syllabus for a degree programme in Communications at what is now the University of Sunderland. I was in charge of the ‘mass media’ side of the project and the study of the media was, then as it is now, essentially organised around questions concerning the forms and processes of public deception, even if many other questions were asked and many different, sometimes conflicting, perspectives and vocabularies were employed to try and answer them. As I indicated above, Jeremy’s own subsequent work included a collection bringing together diverse scholars around these issues.

Taking my initial bearings from these formative points of reference, and making connections with the changed circumstances across the 30 year gap, I want to offer what is in effect a lightly referenced critical review of some longstanding and still important themes to do with deception in public life. It is a useful time to write such a review, since not only has deception of the public continued as a major issue in international politics, whatever changes have occurred both to the styling of political management and the languages of the media, but there has been extensive scholarship and academic dispute on the principal themes. Here, among other references I shall

draw on my own recent work on fundamental problems of definition and of context, and on Martin Jay's very recent historical study, *The Virtues of Mendacity*.²

I shall start by looking briefly at the varieties of deceptive behaviour and the principal ways in which they have been conceptualised by analysts and theorists. Here, the reasons why deception in politics so often is seen to constitute a special case will be examined. The kinds of ethical challenge, compounding that of achieving adequate criteria of identification, which confronts those who wish to see public deception reduced, if not eliminated, will be explored, and the question of the structural and procedural routes (and obstacles) to reform will briefly be posed, giving my discussion at least a partial contact with the practical.

Complexities of Category and Concept.

Just what gets called 'deception' in the public arena and how it is located within a scheme of judgement varies greatly, as the accounts in Hawthorn's collection show. At one level, the issue turns on the matter of 'lying', of writing or speaking that which is known to be untrue with the intended effect of producing false knowledge in the addressee. There is a satisfying directness to the charge of lying and we can be sure that, even allowing for variations in criteria, a great deal of it occurs in public life. It therefore makes sense to retain the idea of 'lying' as a central one in any discussion of deception. Of course, a regular problem with the charge of lying is not so much finding the proof that what has been offered is false (although in some circumstances this can present a challenge) but that it was offered *in the knowledge* that it was false. In most political systems, there are high profile instances in which this problem has been seen to occur. In Britain, for example, the case of Tony Blair's public (and

Parliamentary) judgement that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was necessary principally because of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' is still debated as a 'lie', for a while bringing about the calculated miss-spelling of Blair's name as 'Bliar' as well as various kinds of attempted defence of his 'genuine beliefs' at the time and the faultiness of the intelligence upon which his judgement was based.

In the United States, the testimony (and then the revision to this) of Bill Clinton, regarding the nature of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, constitutes a case of deceit in which the becoming public of private relationships is the primary context. It is also a strong case of 'denial', a form of deception which has become an established part of political performance, partly because of the increased requirement upon politicians within a 24/7 mediascape to make statements, to speak where in the past they might have chosen to remain silent.³ Finally, in a way that could not but have a comic dimension, Clinton's defence of his integrity partly rested on apparent differences of understanding about what 'having sexual relations' might include or not, a point of semantic debate that, in the light of subsequent established details, did little to convince the American public that it was a matter of misunderstanding rather than deceit.

Charges of 'lying' incline towards specific deceptive actions, with a focus on individual ethics, even where corporate action is involved, which is one of the reasons why theorists of 'propaganda' have wanted to broaden the question out to a more systemic level and at the same time displace what might be regarded as too politically naïve a focus on the lie, the localised falsity. In the Hawthorn collection mentioned earlier, the article by Robins et al picks up on a strand of American political science that presented 'propaganda' positively as part of the very core of contemporary

democratic systems and which often championed the kinds of ‘mass mobilization’ it was thought to bring about through its use of ‘strategic’ (i.e. distortive) information management.⁴ The authors want to question this perspective and to note how the official adoption of ‘persuasion’ approaches, however naturalised as part of modern political orders, works finally to close down democratic space and perhaps to create an increased problem for the development of any civic culture having a more participatory, deliberative and critical, character. I agree with their critique but I have more misgivings than they do about the very notion of ‘propaganda’ and the kinds of communicative criteria we can use to identify and judge it. These misgivings extend to the writings of those who have used the term with a strongly negative emphasis, prominent among whom would be Herman and Chomsky, who in their ‘propaganda model’, using the USA as their main point of reference, outlined the constituents of a systematic process of ‘filtering out’ information that did not fit with the interests of the political and corporate elite.⁵ It is interesting that their model differs from the one advanced by some American political scientists not only in presenting a negative rather than positive view of ‘propaganda’ but in placing the emphasis on the *removal* of that which disturbs the dominant view rather than the *production* of that which will activate, engage and reassure. This is a relative rather than categorical difference, to be sure, but it is revealing nonetheless. Another clear, and connected, difference is that whilst the American social science tradition is talking about the ways in the main agencies of the state work *self-consciously* to achieve acquiescence from the public, the ‘propaganda model’ is essentially about the operation of the media within a system in which they are often *unwittingly* servants of the dominant order.

The main problem with both accounts of propaganda, and with others, is the acute lack of clear descriptive criteria by which to identify it (especially the extent to

which ‘lies’ are involved or not in specific examples) and the accompanying weakness of the normative criteria by which it is judged ‘bad’ and to what extent. In particular, this weakness leads to a blurring of propaganda with all forms of promotion in which one position is strategically advanced against another using other than strictly logical, reasoned procedures. By taking a very strong position on sincerity and integrity in public discourse, it is certainly possible (and Jurgen Habermas gets close to this in many of his classic writings) to view all types of strategic persuasion as unacceptable.⁶ However, this extends the terms of critique formidably wide and seriously limits the options for realistic alternatives. One way to avoid this would be to reserve ‘propaganda’ for specific types of communicative practice, marked out by specific kinds and levels of deception (including lies). However, very few writers wishing to use the term critically have provided a sharper focus in this way although the problem of definition has received much discussion. Of course, the most common way in which ‘propaganda’ has been defined, if by assumption rather than explicit claim, is in terms of its *ends* – rather than a ‘bad means’ it has been seen as a form of communication supporting ‘bad ends’ (e.g. historically, Nazism, Communism, or in Herman and Chomsky’s account, the largely unquestioned dominance of the US power elite). The negativity about ends gets transferred to the means, but this then causes problems of consistency and coherence when rather similar approaches (selectivity, exaggeration, appeal to emotions including fear, simplification through slogans) are used in order to promote progressive or radical alternatives. Only a clearer set of ethical values concerning ‘persuasion’ (and the acceptability or not of all the types of deceptive appeal within persuasive forms) would provide the basis for productive debate and perhaps more consistent, rather than opportunist, practice. While ‘propaganda’ remains largely

something ‘the bad guys do’, reasoning will have a strongly circular character and versions of what is propagandist and what not will continue to make the term an obstacle to serious analysis. This will not stop it from continuing to be a convenient, regular label in discussion of persuasive communications, most frequently perhaps where wartime or conflict-related communications are concerned (discussed further below). It also takes on a special force when it used as a way of re-labelling something which has defined itself more positively. The most obvious case of this is journalism, which when called ‘propaganda’ has its grounding professional values called seriously into question. However, the range of very different, and often indirect and partial, ways in which kinds of journalism routinely support elite power and marginalise contrary views - an issue as old as journalism itself - may be missed in the over-dramatic and simplistic use of this accusation.

Ideology is another term which has had an internationally wide and influential use to identify and critique modes of deceptive public discourse. Its conceptual scope and complexity are, of course, such as to render any attempt at discussion here very limited indeed, but it is worth noting that those who employ ‘ideology’ as a central part of their engagement with forms of public expression, including through the media, rarely find much use for the idea of ‘propaganda’. Since across most of its many versions, a theory of ideology assumes the routine and extensive impact of dominant class-based economic relations upon everyday consciousness and ideas of the ‘natural’, it is not surprising that the additional notion of the propagandistic seems redundant, if not also unacceptably crude in its analytic approach to the forms that symbolic dominance may take. The reverse of this is also true. Those committed to the critical idea of ‘propaganda’, following the ideas of Herman and Chomsky, have often been notably uninterested in connecting their diagnosis with the long and broad

Marxian tradition of ideological critique. The two big ideas, whilst not strictly incompatible, have shown a good degree of mutual indifference. Despite its problems, some of which I have pointed to in my own writing, it seems to me that many of the ideas at work in thinking about ideology (for instance, about subjectivity, the unconscious, the 'naturalization' of what is contingent, the strategic use of the historical record) continue to have relevance for any thinking about deception in public life and the possibility of alternatives, and they will need to be incorporated into any further progress on this front. However, a substantial block to the development of ideology critique itself has been the failure to engage convincingly with the question of reducing ideological effects without invoking an idea of wholesale revolutionary economic and political change which both infinitely postpones any real shift and at the same time tends to discount any phased and partial attempts at 'reform'. The tendency of such critique to have a strongly terminal tendency in its political diagnosis has therefore not made it useful to those seeking to rescue some pragmatic options from their analysis.

The Specificity of the Political

But how far and in what ways might 'politics' be the space of forms of deception which require special consideration, quite apart from their obvious seriousness of context, when considered alongside those at work more broadly in society? The long history of political theory shows a continuing thread of comment on this question, sometimes unequivocal but most often ambivalent or even contradictory in its verdicts. There has been a marked inclination to stop well short of rejecting wholesale all use of deceptive forms in politics, including forms of hypocrisy, false denials and

appeals made persuasive by the use of selective and incorrect information. Such caution has followed from recognition that a degree of deceit may be required by the very nature of politics as a practice essentially concerning interest group tensions and compromises, across and within intensive flows of power. This is a practice in which total transparency, it is sometimes claimed, would seriously impede 'the best outcome' by, among other things, giving offence, feeding unchecked into established prejudices, giving opponents time to 'block' action and placing limits on policy devised in the 'best general interest'. It is apparent that this is a strongly *pragmatic* view of the political field in relation to any idea of the ethics of discourse, but it is one that has been taken by a wide range of political commentators, including those working not only in the cynical vein of Machiavelli but in the spirit of democratic development, such as Hannah Arendt. In a widely-cited comment on the pervasiveness of lying in politics she observed that 'lies have always been regarded as necessary and justifiable tools not only of the politician's or the demagogue's but also of the statesman's trade', noting that 'lies, since they are often used as substitutes for more violent means, are apt to be considered relatively harmless tools in the arsenal of political action'.⁷ In her writings on lying in politics, which show some variations of emphasis, she shows her reluctance, partly in the interests of practicality, to move to a position of total condemnation. She judges that 'seen from the viewpoint of politics, truth has a despotic character'. For democracies, it has this character because it can preclude debate 'and debate constitutes the very essence of political life'.⁸ Another reason why she believes that forms of deception may be admissible in politics is because politics often involves the future, requiring of the politician *imaginative action*, perhaps action to change the world. Arendt, particularly in her earlier writing on the subject, is essentially talking about the forms of politics that oppose totalitarian

systems but her often uneasy, if not rather contradictory, remarks on political deception, connect with the established record of astute thinkers finally making what are carefully qualified remarks about the matter, although few are as prepared as she is to be so explicit about ‘lying’. In a further attempt to carry out differentiating analysis, she makes a distinction between ‘normal’ lying, of the kind that has been going on in politics for centuries, and what she sees as a new tendency towards forms of institutionalized lying in which the truth is not so much temporarily suppressed as permanently removed from the record. That she was not thinking only of totalitarian systems here is indicated by the fact that the point of departure for her second main essay on the theme was the leaked publication of The Pentagon Papers, showing the ‘internal’ elite analysis and discussion of the Vietnam War in ways which contrasted dramatically, in their frankness and negativity, with the accounts officially presented by political and military leaders and reported in the press⁹.

Arendt’s writings will remain a major, if rather inconsistent and occasionally cryptic, point of reference for any attempt to think seriously about questions of deception in public life. They certainly engage and provoke much more productively than that tradition of commentary which simply sees all deceptive practice, including the withholding of information and less than total transparency as to motives, means and outcomes, as completely unjustified, no matter what the circumstances. Another one of Arendt’s much-cited comments is that mendacity is so closely intertwined with politics that ‘moral outrage, for this reason, is not likely to make it disappear’.¹⁰ I want to turn now to look more closely at how moral measurement fits into the picture.

Before I do it is worth noting one other broad, complicating factor in assessing deception in the political arena, mentioned by some writers and omitted by others, despite it having a classical pedigree in Athenian texts. This is the relationship

between the political realm and the realm of military action and national security. For a very long time, deception has been seen as a necessary and acceptable element of the 'art of warfare' and secrecy has been regarded as a necessary element of national security. The fear that practices justified here might then 'contaminate' the national political order, for instance by the withholding of information and the attempt to boost domestic morale and mislead the enemy at the same time, has been regularly expressed. With the increasing complexity of contemporary political systems, and the growing interpenetration of military and political elites, this risk is all too obvious, perhaps becoming more prevalent during the present 'war on terror' phase of international relations than the preceding 'cold war'. It is not surprising that, in this context, calls for closer critical attention to official statements about the conduct of military actions and to the activities of the intelligence services, have regularly been heard. Certainly, in Britain the example of the conflict in Afghanistan from around 2008 would show failures in the effectiveness of official accounts to counter the impact of a wide range of critical, dissenting voices, which have served (often usefully) to complicate the public sense of 'what is going on'. Some of these voices have come from within the military establishment itself and many of them have entered public space through the means of the web, which has 'changed the game' for public deception in ways which academic inquiry is now beginning to explore.

Principle and Circumstance.

I have noted how discussion of deception in public life, particularly in politics, has a strongly circumstantial rather than categorical character. Certain kinds of deception, according to their nature and context, might be widely judged as so grievous as to

require the resignation of the official or politician who sanctioned or devised them, while other forms quietly continue, generating little if any public concern. Partly, this may be because they are not judged as serious enough, in their likely impact upon public knowledge, to require attention. One factor here could be that they have been *anticipated*, rather in the way that the exaggerations and selective work of advertising are anticipated. To believe what is said at its 'full value' would signal a naivety on the part of the receiver more than anything culpable in the actions of the sender. We can refer here to the notion of 'spin', a term which was widely used (somewhat ironically, in the media themselves) to indicate a new scale and sophistication of news management at work in British politics, particularly following the election of the Labour government in 1997. The usage was American, essentially a metaphor from baseball about the way a ball could be thrown in such a way as to have a curving rather than straight flight (cricket would provide another example). Although some coverage of 'spin' made it seem like a new, sinister assault on democratic space (particularly the notional freedom of the press to report without constraint), it quickly became, as it had in America, a relatively muted term of critique, effectively a descriptive term for an aspect of 'normal' politics.. 'Spin' warranted a sceptical approach to press releases, true, but it was essentially a way of trying to tell 'good stories' to the media, and to cover-up any 'badness' as far as possible; it was about a kind of 'curving' and 'bending' in accounts, making your own actions look positive and those of your opponent weak. 'Spin-doctors' quickly became part of the established, legitimised political scene. They could be presented in a largely positively light in the hugely successful series U.S. television series, *The West Wing* (NBC 1999-2006) and even in Britain, they could be portrayed in television drama (for instance, *The Thick of It*, BBC, 2005-) as more comic than sinister. 'Spin' was an

accepted part both of inter-party claims-making and the general business of press releases, press conferences and political interviews. Only when it reached a certain magnitude, in specific contexts, did it start to cross the boundaries of acceptability. Describing the claims about Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq as ‘spin’ finally escaped the terms of the metaphor once the true state of affairs was revealed. No longer was ‘curving’ or ‘bending’ at issue, but ‘invention’. The semi-professionalised term of ‘spin’ gave way to the more familiar idea of the lie.

Martin Jay’s rich historical account, cited earlier, of the ways in which political mendacity has been debated over the centuries, with writers nearly always recognising ‘honesty’ as an important political virtue but also being reluctant to condemn all deception as unacceptable, is a long way from providing any clear discourse ethics by which public practice might be guided. Among Jay’s conclusions (partly echoing Arendt) is that ‘the search for perfect truthfulness is not only vain but also potentially dangerous’ and that ‘it may be healthier to foster lots of little countervailing lies or at least half-truths, as well as the ability to test and see through them, rather than hold out hope for ending mendacity once for all’. We may have to concede, he suggests, that ‘there are many necessary fictions at the heart of even the most transparent and accountable of political systems’.¹¹ Although there is much good sense here, there is also something nervous, overly qualified and a little fudging (the ‘ability to test and see through them’ is revealing in its counter-movement). My view is that we need a more comprehensive and intellectually tougher set of principles to work with, ones that fully recognise the range of existing practices and their motives but go well beyond the kind of ‘on the one hand/on the other’ formulations that have proliferated to date. We cannot get a clear general code for all circumstances, certainly, but a more detailed, typological attention to kinds and levels of deception,

written as a guide to judgement and practice, would be welcome. Among other things, this might reduce the ease by which politicians, at regular intervals, call for ‘a new politics’, one in which ‘honesty’ will be placed at the centre. The sheer vacuity of such grand formulations, constructed as they almost always are as opportunist exercises in claiming the ‘high ground’ rather than as serious proposals (it is hard to imagine many members of the public believing them), is further testimony to that mess around the integrity of public claims-making into which many political systems have got themselves.

If we are not going to see things change *simply* as a result of clearer ethical principles and imperatives, although I have noted that these principles are an early requirement, what kinds of measure might be introduced to exert better oversight and ‘regulation’?

For most forms of public deception, even those ostensibly carried out ‘in the public interest’, a great discouragement is recognition of the probability of the deception being exposed, with consequences ranging from embarrassment through to resignation. Not all deceptive work is carried out according to a clear calculus of risk, of course, some of it is reactive and has a spontaneous and then accumulative nature rather than proceeding in relation to a clear plan. However, fear of exposure remains a strong factor. Here, the continuing if inconsistent role of the media in auditing the behaviour of politicians, in part by dealing in ‘leaks’ as well as sustained investigation, must remain a central part of the picture. This picture is changing, sometimes quite rapidly, as a result of the increasing use of the web to carry a range of alternative versions to the official accounts. Sometimes these alternative versions are false and sometimes, as in the press, they are driven by other motives than ‘public interest’, but their impact upon what we can call the profile of public claims-making

(often, as in elections, made in the narrow and tactical pursuit of political party advantage) is, in sum, beneficial.

What role can civic action play in introducing better standards in the discourse through which politics is discussed and performed? Here, I think there is a place for the kind of ‘citizen juries’ that have recently been mooted in Britain in the wake of the News International ‘phone hacking’ revelations and the perceived requirement for improved forms of media regulation.¹² Citizen juries are no means without their own problems as a way of adjudicating on public conduct, but there are ways in which their incorporation into the structure of media oversight, and into the regular audit of parliamentary business and political claims-making, could act to introduce higher levels of self-consciousness about standards and provide a curb on deceitfulness. Abuse of power will not be ‘solved’ procedurally, of course, that is to work with a naïve view of how political systems operate. However, giving mendacity in politics sharper formal attention in public space, according to civic as well as professional opinion and in relation to a tougher body of working principles, would, in many countries, significantly advance practical democracy.

It is necessary to engage with the current forms of political distortion through a number of responses, discursive and structural, by which, to quote Jeremy Hawthorn again, ‘suspicion can be turned into active resistance’.¹³

¹ Preface to Jeremy Hawthorn (ed.), *Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic* (London: Arnold, 1987).

² Martin Jay, *The Virtues of Mendacity* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010). Some of my own recent ideas on the theme, with references to a wider range of chapters and articles I have

written on related topics over the years, are contained in John Corner, *Theorising Media: Power, Form and Subjectivity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011).

³ Politicians' 'need to speak' in response to intensive media questioning on issues, where formally they might have declined to make any statement at all, at least for a while, is one key element in the new dynamics of denial.

⁴ Kevin Robins, Frank Webster and Michael Pickering, 'Propaganda, Information and Social Control' Jeremy Hawthorn (ed.) *Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic*, pp. 1-17.

⁵ The principal text here is Edward Herman and Naom Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

⁶ A key account is Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol 2* (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1987).

⁷ These two phrases come from Hannah Arendt, 'Truth and Politics' in Peter Baehr (ed.), *The Portable Hannah Arendt* (New York: Viking 2000) pp. 545 and 546.

⁸ Arendt, 'Truth and Politics', 556

⁹ This essay is 'Lying in Politics', in Hannah Arendt *Crises of the Republic* (New York: Mariner Books 1972). The differences and the connections between this account and 'Truth and Politics' cited earlier (first published in *The New Yorker* in 1967) have been the subject of much discussion, including in Martin Jay, *The Virtues of Mendacity*.

¹⁰ Hannah Arendt, 'Lying in Politics', p.4

¹¹ All above quotes from Martin Jay, *The Virtues of Mendacity*, pp. 179-180. Among other recent writers to present a qualified argument of this kind, particularly in relation to the practice of hypocrisy, is David Runciman in his *Political Hypocrisy* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008).

¹² The 'phone-hacking' scandals of 2011, in which the private space both of celebrities and ordinary people was intruded upon, have temporarily, at least, changed the climate around media regulation in the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, official investigations into precisely what happened and what reforms are needed are still continuing. The idea of groups of citizens being somehow brought more into the structure of decision-making about media ethics and their application in particular cases has been widely discussed, even if practical arrangements for it remain a challenge.

¹³ Jeremy Hawthorn, *Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic*. p.xiv